Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War

A major omission of almost all military histories of the Second World War has been the failure to emphasize the economic dimension of the conflict, and to establish beyond question the importance of the Allies’ superior industrial capacity and reserves of raw material to the outcome of the war. In this provocative and ground-breaking study, John Ellis finally sets the record straight. Skillfully analyzing a mass of previously inaccessible and often quite astonishing data, he demonstrates conclusively that Allied victory—against both the Axis and Japan—finally owed for more to the endless stream of tanks, artillery and military aircraft rolling off Allied production lines than it did to the ability of their commanders. Drawing from his masterly analysis of production statistics, Ellis reviews the entire course of the war and demonstrates how American, British and Russian commanders continually mismanaged the resources at their deposal and how serious mistakes were made in almost every theater of war—land, sea and air. Time and again, Allied generals proved incapable of deploying their numerical advantage in the most effective way, instead falling back on crude, attritional tactics that prolonged the war unnecessarily: appalling armored tactics in Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe; Bomber Command’s wrongheaded targeting policies; Russian acceptance of enormous casualty bills; the American navy’s failure to recognize that Japan’s economy and lines of imperial communication should have been the prime target—all of these issues and many more are thoroughly aired in this authoritative and stimulating work.